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SHOULD WE BAN OR WELCOME "SPEC" HOME
BUYERS?
This article begins by recounting the extent to which speculating buyers
contributed more than proportionately to housing price volatility and the rate of
mortgage foreclosure. Home 'flippers" never expect to take up occupancy in the
houses they buy; instead, they hope to profit from a quick resale. Speculating home
buyers represented about a quarterof the market in many cities and acceleratedfalling
house prices and risingforeclosure rates by defaulting as soon as the housing bubble
started to shrink-far more quickly than would owner occupants. If spec buyers had
been kept out of the market, housing prices would have been less volatile and
foreclosure rates lower.
The second section turns to the way spec buyers deceived mortgage lenders by
committing occupancyfraud, claimingfalsely that they were buying as owner occupants
so they could benefitfrom more favorable mortgage rates and terms. Though the FBI
haspursued some egregiousperpetratorsof occupancy fraud, the best way of deterring
borrowersfrom committing occupancy fraud is by lenders screening them out through
improved underwriting. Telltale signs in loan applications and borrower background
checks make occupancy fraud detectable, especially with the aid of specially designed
software and a considerabledetermined effort.
The third section starts by describing the mischief spec buyers caused home
builders and condo developers by signalingphantom housing demand and degrading
'for sale" housing tracts and condo developments by leaving newly bought homes
vacant or filling them with short term rentals. Next, I describe the means used by
homebuilders to restrain home flippers. I also explain why these restraints tended to
appearonly in purchase and sale contracts and not in deeds, confining enforcement to
contract actions againstflip buyers but not upsetting sales to the flip buyers' buyers.
The doctrine barring all but promissory restraints on alienation figures prominently
here, along with practicalmarketing considerations.
The fourth section explores the rationalefor a government imposed ban on home
flipping. This would be a publicly imposed constraint on alienability.Here, I examine a
particularproposal that a law professor advanced a few years ago for a local
ordinance that would bar new home or condo resales by spec buyers for a period of
years. After detailing the drafting issues that would need to be resolved in such an
ordinance,I conclude that an inalienabilityordinance would no longer be sustainable,
because spec buyers are now welcome and widely perceived as much needed rescuers
in resuscitating deflated housing markets by bidding up the prices of foreclosed
properties.
By George Lefcoe*
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Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 36:1
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I. SPEC BUYERS CONTRIBUTED TO HOUSE PRICE VOLATILITY

When house and condo prices were soaring in many regions of the United States
from 2004 to 2006,1 speculating ("spec") buyers climbed on board for the all-toofleeting joyride. They hoped to profit from reselling swiftly without ever moving in, and
they lied to lenders and developers, claiming their acquisitions were for their own use
and occupancy.2 Spec buyers (a.k.a. non-owner occupants) began to awaken from their
dreams of quick riches and started defaulting on their mortgages in droves the moment
house prices showed signs of flattening out; they would not be able to recoup their
invested equity plus their share of the closing costs. 3 With spec buyers forming about a
quarter of the market, University of Texas Economics Professor Stan Leibowitz
explains: "[The number of spec buyers is] large enough that if only a minority of
speculators defaulted when housing prices stopped increasing,
it could have explained
4
all or most of the entire increase in foreclosures started."
To see how this played out in one market, consider Las Vegas where home and
condo prices rose sharply in 2004-2005, peaked in 2006, 5 and then began a slow
descent, dropping 40-50% by 2009.6 Their profits peaked at about 20% in 2004,

1.See ANTHONY DOWNS, REAL ESTATE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: How TURMOIL IN THE CAPITAL
MARKETS Is RESTRUCTURING REAL ESTATE FINANCE 56-59 & exh.2-16 to 2-17 (2009) (describing the
variation in median home prices and the rate of change in home prices in various metropolitan areas since
1997); DENNIS CAUCHON, USA TODAY, WHY HOME VALUES MAY TAKE DECADES TO RECOVER (2009),
http://i.usatoday.net/news/graphics/housing-prices/home-prices.pdf ("The housing bubble began in 1998,
peaked in 2006 and burst in 2007."); see also Andrea Pescatori & Bethany Tinlin, Home Prices, ECON.
TRENDS,
Apr.
2007,
at
7,
8,
available
at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/trends/2007/0407/ET-aprO7.pdf ("Although growth rates in structure
values have been fairly similar and stable across regions, land values on both coasts have accelerated
significantly. This means that the driving force behind home price growth is the value of the land rather than
the structure itself. Except for the Southwest, where land is relatively abundant, land's share of total home
value has increased in all regions.").
2. See Ruth Simon & Michael Corkery, Speculators May Have Accelerated Housing Downturn, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 6, 2008, at B8 (reporting that results of a study in which Fitch Ratings found that, in two-thirds of
the subprime loan cases studied where borrowers with good credit scores defaulted within the first twelve
months, the borrowers had never moved into the properties they said they were going to occupy in their loan
applications).
3. Closing costs typically range from 5% to 10% of the house price. Ginnie Mae, Your Path to Home
Ownership:
A
Guide
to
Owning
Your
Own
Home,
http://www.ginniemae.gov/4_home/closing__cost.asp?section=YPTH (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
4. Stan J. Liebowitz, Anatomy of a Trainwreck: Causes of the Mortgage Meltdown, in HOUSING
AMERICA: BUILDING OUT OF A CRISIS 287, 316 (Randall G. Holcombe & Benjamin W. Powell eds., 2009).
5. See Les Christie, Las Vegas Tops ForeclosureList, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 5, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/05/real estate/zip-code.foreclosures/index.htm ("In 2004 alone, the median,
single-family home price in the city grew by [47%], and that was followed by another [14%] rise the next
year. By 2006, the median home cost $317,400, nearly [50%] higher than the national average."); see also
Brian Wargo, Prediction: LV Home-Price Decline Will Hit 52 Percent, IN BUSINESS LAS VEGAS, Jan. 30,
2009, at 15, available at
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/jan/30/prediction-las-vegas-home-price-decline-will-hit-5/.
6. See Las Vegas October 2008 Home Sales Report, DQNEwS.CoM, Nov. 29, 2008,
http://www.dqnews.com/Articles/2008/News/Las-Vegas/RRCLNVO81129.aspx
("The overall median sale
price has fallen on a year-over-year basis for [eighteen] consecutive months and is now [37.2%] below the
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accounting for opportunity costs, but had fallen to zero by 2007. 7 For several years, Las
Vegas's foreclosure rates have stood highest in the nation. 8 Spec buyers accounted for
9
which is about three times the rate of
up to 60% of the Las Vegas foreclosures,
10
occupants.
owner
among
foreclosures
Another reason foreclosure rates spiked among spec buyers is that they preferred
subprime loans with low introductory, barely affordable "teaser" rates. Subprime
borrowing increased dramatically among all types of borrowers in locales with
escalating home prices. Even buyers with credit scores good enough to qualify them for
prime mortgage loans took out subprime loans. 11 Spec buyers were not too worried
about the high long-term cost of servicing this subprime debt once the "teaser" period
ended. Optimistically, they expected to sell at a whopping profit long before then and to
prepay their acquisition financing from sale proceeds. 12 As house prices cooled and
then fell, buyers looking for a quick exit were not able to sell or refinance their
subprime mortgages. Mix spec buyers with subprime loans and declining home prices,
and you have a stomach churning recipe for a housing finance disaster.
As prices subside, spec buyers are more inclined to default than purchasers intent
on occupancy, "because the vast majority of people who live in their homes plan to stay
there for the long term and will not sell based on periodic economic corrections, thus
keeping the market relatively stable." ' 13 Owner occupants search for the best available
place to live and tend not to abandon their homes-and forfeit their sunk costs-at the
first sign of prices leveling off. They tend to stay put at least until their current housing
outlays exceed what they will need to spend to acquire their next domicile-taking into
account all the expenses of selling, buying, or renting and moving to their next place, as
well as the hardship of disrupting the lives of everyone in the household and blemishing
their own credit. 14 Most purchasers planning to remain in their homes for a number of
region's peak $312,000 median in November 2006. October's median was the lowest since it was $192,000 in
January 2004. Another gauge analysts watch suggests greater price weakness: The median price paid per
square foot for resale detached houses fell to $104 in October-the lowest since May 2003. Last month's
figure was down [34.8%] from a year ago and down [45.1%] from the $190 peak reached in June 2006.").
7. Id. at 259-260 & fig.7.
8. See Press Release, RealtyTrac, Foreclosure Activity Remains at Record Levels in April (May 13,
2009),
http://www.realtytrac.com/contentmanagement/pressrelease.aspx?channelid-9&accnt-0&itemid=6379.
9. Simon & Corkery, supra note 2.
10. BASEPOiNT ANALYTICS LLC, OCCUPANCY FRAUD AND THE IMPACT TO THE MORTGAGE INDUSTRY 7

(2008) (on file with author) (reporting that an analysis conducted by the Mortgage Bankers Association in
2007 "indicated that investment properties represented up to [three] times the level of risk of default than
owner occupied properties").
11. Markham Lee, Subprime Mortgages Crossing Income and Credit Strata, SEEKING ALPHA, Oct. 12,
("The
2007, http://seekingalpha.com/article/49701-subprime-mortgages-crossing-income-and-credit-strata
truth is that many affluent buyers used subprime loans to purchase more home then they could afford with a
prime loan, make speculative real estate 'investments' and/or to withdraw more equity from their home than
they could with a prime [home equity line of credit].").
12. See Steven Malanga, ForeclosureMyths: Can the Media Handle the Truth?, REALCLEARMARKETS,
Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2008/10/foreclosure-myths-can-media-ha.htm
(explaining that adjustable-rate mortgages tend to draw buyers who expect to sell or refinance before the
mortgage rates reset).
13. Randy Steinberg, Curbing Flipping,MULTIFAMILY TRENDS, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 20, 23.
14. Cf Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul Willen, Negative Equity and Foreclosure:
Theory and Evidence, 64 J. URB. ECON. 234, 240-41 (2008) (studying the foreclosure history of 100,000
Massachusetts homeowners with negative equity in the 1990s). The study found that (1)only about 6.4% of
these homeowners lost their homes through foreclosure; (2) the borrowers' cash flow situations greatly
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years tend to shrug off home price declines as temporary. Of course, owner occupants
sometimes default, too, and lose their homes to foreclosure. But their defaults are
almost always precipitated by events other than fluctuating house prices-job loss,
divorce, illness, or the death or disability of the primary wage earner. 15 Of course, they
do not need to stand passively by and lose their homes to foreclosure when house prices
are buoyant. In good times, they just need to face reality, list the home with a competent
broker, and prepare to relocate.
Perhaps if Las Vegas and other cities could have found a way to reduce the ranks of
spec buyers in overheated markets, there would have been less overbuilding during the
housing boom and fewer foreclosures now. This article recounts the main options
potentially available to builders and lenders to detect and keep out spec buyers,
including a law professor's proposal for a government imposed alienability limit: a
minimum holding period before sale. This is a good time to understand what these
options can accomplish, to appreciate their limitations, and to realize why we cannot
expect much interest in them during a house price deflation.
II.

REAL ESTATE LENDERS SUFFER FROM AND ARE GOOD COST AVOIDERS OF
MORTGAGE OCCUPANCY FRAUD

The most favorable home mortgage terms are reserved for owner occupants both to
advance home ownership and to recognize the lower delinquency rates of owner
occupants. 16 Owner occupants qualify for mortgages with interest rates 40% lower than
what banks would charge an investor, much smaller down payments, two months
reserve to cover property taxes and insurance (instead of six months), and significantly
less documentation since lenders require investors to demonstrate a history of success in
•
• 17
managing properties.
Mortgage lenders insist that borrowers seeking to qualify for these advantageous
terms affirm that they will move into the mortgaged property as their principal
residence within sixty days of executing their loan agreements and will continue
occupancy for at least one year, barring extenuating circumstances beyond the
borrower's control or the lender's written consent. 18 Borrowers signing Fannie Mae

(FNMA) or Freddie Mac (FHLMC) uniform deeds of trust or mortgages are in default if
they provide "materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information" in their loan
applications, specifically including misrepresentations concerning occupancy as the
19
borrower's principal residence.
influenced their risk of default; and (3) the net present value of defaulting on a mortgage can be negative even
for a borrower with negative equity. See id. at 240-42.
15. See CHARLES A. CAPONE, JR., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH INTO MORTGAGE DEFAULT AND
AFFORDABLE
HOUSING:
A
PRIMER
13
(2002),
available
at
http://www.lisc.org/files/906 file-asset_upload-file755-793.pdf
16. See BASEPOINT ANALYTICS LLC, supra note 10, at 2 ("Because lenders typically charge a higher
interest rate for non-owner occupied properties, which historically have higher delinquency rates, the lenders
often times will receive insufficient return on their capital, and are over-exposed on risk losses relative to
what they would have expected for an owner occupied property.").
17. Id. at 3.

18. See Fannie Mae/ Freddie Mac, Form 3005: California Deed of Trust,
6,
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.htm
(follow "Form 3005: California Deed of Trust"
hyperlink).
19. Id. at 8 ("Material misrepresentations include, but are not limited to, representations concerning
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Many spec buyers commit occupancy fraud, lying about their intentions to reside
in the mortgaged property in order to qualify for low- or no-down payment loans with
favorable interest rates. 2 1 This enables them to benefit from leverage, 22 magnifying
their gains if home prices go up while leaving the mortgage lender with the losses if
23
prices go down.
Current federal law provides enforcement agencies with authority to prosecute
mortgage fraud. 2 4 Penalties include the possible loss of the property, which would
result in a forfeiture of the borrower's equity. 2 5 State criminal laws empower state law
enforcement agencies to pursue perpetrators of mortgage fraud, and many state civil
laws empower private individuals
and institutions to pursue mortgage fraud as unfair or
S 26
deceptive acts or practices.
Also, mortgage lenders are entitled to enforce owner
occupancy provisions in their loan agreements, allowing them to foreclose against
27
breaching borrowers.
After-the-fact prosecutions do not prevent losses nearly as well as improved

Borrower's occupancy of the Property as Borrower's principal residence.").
20. See GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 171-73 (6th ed.
2009).
21. See The Prieston Group Finds Occupancy FraudDominates Claims,NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept.
19, 2005, at 28 (reporting that over half of the mortgage fraud claims filed with The Prieston Group in the first
half of 2005 involved occupancy fraud; The Prieston Group is a firm that provides due diligence services on
behalf of lenders and insures them against loss due to fraud); Lew Sichelman, Lenders Looking at 'White Lie'
Fraud, ORIGINATION NEWS, Jan. 2006, at 6, 6 (reporting that in 75% of the insurance claims involving
occupancy fraud, the fraud was committed by borrowers who did not want to pay investor interest rates).
22. Financial leverage is the "use of debt to increase the expected return on equity." Bloomberg.com,
Financial Glossary, http://www.bloomberg.com/invest/glossary/bfglosf.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
23. See JOSHUA ROSNER, HOUSING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: A HOME WITHOUT EQUITY IS JUST A
RENTAL WITH DEBT 29 (2001), http://ssm.com/abstract-l162456 ("The virtuous circle of increasing
homeownership through greater leverage has the potential to become a vicious cycle of lower home prices due
to an accelerating rate of foreclosures caused by lower savings.").
24. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006) (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. §
2314 (2006) (transfers in interstate or foreign commerce of fraudulently obtained funds or goods); 18 U.S.C. §
1344 (2006) (defrauding federally chartered or federally insured institutions); 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2006)
(making false statements or reports, including overvaluations, to influence federal agencies or federally
chartered or federally insured institutions); United States v. Hitchens, 62 F. App'x 417, 418-19 (3d Cir. 2002)
(holding that the prosecutor did not need to show that real estate agent personally used the mails or wires to
convey fraudulent documents as long as she knew that the mails or wires would be used in the ordinary course
of business).
25. See, e.g., United States v. 874 Gartel Drive, 79 F.3d 918, 923-24 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming order of
forfeiture where the owners falsely reported their income in order to obtain a loan from a federally insured
financial institution and the owners knew, or were willfully blind to, the false statements in the loan
application); United States v. 403
Skyline Drive, 797 F. Supp. 796, 798 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (granting
summary judgment in forfeiture action where owner had misrepresented his employment status on his loan
application, even though loan was not in default).
26. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N, MORTGAGE FRAUD: STRENGTHENING FEDERAL AND STATE
MORTGAGE
FRAUD
PREVENTION
EFFORTS
17
(2007),
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Conferences/2008/2008Fraud/FraudO8MBAFraudPreventionHandoutN
ewReg.pdf.
27. Investors Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ganz, 416 A.2d 918, 921-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980) ("[The
court does] not find that the owner occupancy requirement is unconscionable or inequitable. Given plaintiff's
purpose to promote home ownership, its policy of not making loans except for that reason, and the language
of [the statute], it cannot be said that its requirement of owner occupancy as a condition for the granting of a
mortgage loan is unjust. Defendants were fully aware of this condition when they freely and voluntarily
entered into the mortgage transaction. Furthermore, plaintiff's fear that the lack of owner occupancy might
jeopardize its security is not unreasonable. Since defendants have defaulted, plaintiff has the right to
accelerate the due date of the unpaid balance of the debt and to require payment thereof. Such payment having
not been made as demanded, summary judgment of foreclosure is appropriate.").
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underwriting and mortgage lenders denying loans to spec buyers in the first place. On
average, lenders will lose about one-third of their investment in a home or condo
foreclosure.28 There are fairly good indicators of occupancy fraud risk, but they require
loan originators to scrutinize loan application carefully, increasing the costs of
underwriting and delaying loan closings. 29 "The mortgage application is, and always
will be, the starting or ending point for fraud. The catastrophic collapse of the subprime
market demonstrates a need for all lenders and investors to seriously reevaluate their
' 30
current approach to risk management."
One tell-tale sign of fraud is when the borrower's current monthly housing costs are
much lower-200% or more-than the borrower's projected monthly costs for the
home being purchased. 3 1 Another is when a loan applicant who says she is a renter has
filed a tax return claiming homeowner deductions for property taxes and mortgage
interest payments. 32 A private firm called BasePoint Analytics markets software that is
specially designed to ferret out these anomalies. But even the best available software
does not eliminate the need for extensive, skillful underwriting, because six out of every
seven transactions the BasePoint software identifies as suspicious prove to be
legitimate. 33
The increased underwriting effort may be cost justified. "The savings from
detecting the fraudulent loan far outweigh the time to review," notes BasePoint
Analytics. 34 But many lenders did not act as if they believed this in 2003-2006 when
the rush was on to speed loan approvals in a climate of swiftly rising home prices that
many lenders believed could never fall. 35 Lenders could have done more to detect

28. See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N, LENDERS' COST OF FORECLOSURE 2 (2008),
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Advocacy/2008/LendersCostofForeclosure.pdf ("While losses can vary
widely, several independent studies find them to be generally quite significant: over $50,000 per foreclosed
home or as much as [30-60%] of the outstanding loan balance.").
29. RMBS Trends: Tighter U.S. Subprime Mortgage Underwriting Showing up Slowly in Rated
Securitizations, STANDARD & POOR'S (May 8, 2007), (on file with author). In fact, the brisk and breezy
underwriting practices of 2000-2007 enabled home loans to close in thirty days while current stringent bank
underwriting has brought us back the ninety day closings reminiscent of the 1990s and earlier.
30. Kevin Coop, It's Time to Go Back to the Future, MORTGAGE BANKING, Nov. 1, 2007, at 118.
According to the chief executive officer of Interthinx, a company that supplies risk mitigation and regulatory
compliance tools to the financial services industry:
A new wave of insidious mortgage fraud awaits us. As lending requirements change,
fraudsters change their methods to evade new loan guidelines. With many lenders now
requiring a [20%] down payment and W-2s to prove income, Interthinx investigators
are seeing an increase in silent-second mortgages and "self-employed" borrowers.
[Interthinx is] also seeing an increase in family members and straw buyers "rescuing"

borrowers facing foreclosure, builder bail-outs and severe fallout from fraudulent condo
conversions.
Id.
31. BASEPOINT ANALYTICS LLC, supra note 10, at 7 ("Borrowers experiencing payment shock over

200% are more likely to be purchasing an investment property.").
32. Id.
33. Id. at 8.
34. Id.
35. See MORTGAGE ASSET RESEARCH INST., EIGHTH PERIODIC MORTGAGE FRAUD CASE REPORT TO
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION 11 (2006),
available at http://www.marisolutions.com/resources-

news/reports.asp (follow "Eighth Case Report to MBA (April 2006)" hyperlink) (identifying "the ever-present
drive to speed up the mortgage approval process" and "escalating home prices in many markets" as "[t]wo
exacerbating factors [that] have combined over the past few years to pressure the industry into non-traditional

practices that will contribute to future fraud reports").
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occupancy fraud, according to Frank McKenna, chief fraud
strategist for BasePoint
36
Analytics, "but the industry was very focused on volume."
Greater loan volume meant sizable loan origination fees and interest rate premiums
for lenders making risky loans. Lenders competed with each other for investors' funds,
and until the riskiness of poorly underwritten portfolios came to light through torrential
rates of default and foreclosure losses, investors flocked to lenders offering the highest
yields. Even as late as 2008, a lender whose short-term profits fell, as it reduced loan
volume by taking more time to underwrite loans and rejecting the riskiest loan
applicants, stood to lose investors to its more aggressive competitors. Many investors
would have perceived the lender's claim that it was reducing future losses from
excessive risk taking as an excuse for its failure
to produce competitive yields in the
37
midst of what tumed out to be a housing bubble.

Unfortunately, lenders usually uncover evidence of mortgage fraud only after the
borrower has defaulted and the lender or its agent has carefully examined the original
loan file. 38 Lenders reserve the right to call their loans, declaring the balance
immediately due and payable, and to foreclose if the borrower did not already prepay
the loan. 39 Ordinarily, people who fib do not cost their lenders a dime. They tend to
make their payments on time, just like most everybody else. But when those who use
deception to obtain financing get in over their heads and cannot--or will not-make
their payments, their lenders stand to lose big too. 40 As long as the borrower is making
payments on time, a lender who happens to suspect mortgage fraud is put to a hard
choice: keep collecting mortgage payments as if nothing is amiss or face a big financial
hit by precipitating a foreclosure.

III. TRACT HOME BUILDERS AND CONDO DEVELOPERS HAVE FOUND VARIOUS MEANS
OF DETERRING SPEC BUYERS; ALL OF THEM ARE IMPERFECT, THOUGH NOT
COMPLETELY INEFFECTUAL

The Damage Spec Buyers Wrought
Spec buyers are good news and bad news for condo developers and tract home
builders. A unit sold, even to someone who never plans to live in it, is better for the
builder's bottom line than a unit unsold-though only a minority of home builders
admit to welcoming spec buyers. 4 1 Yet, no builder or developer welcomes competition
from spec buyers before successfully concluding its marketing and sales effort. 42 In

36. Simon & Corkery, supra note 2.
37. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO
DEPRESSION 90-91 (2009).

38. See Sichelman, supra note 21.

39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 22 & exh.l-14 ("Although many homebuilders tried to avoid selling to
such speculators, the shares of home and condominium sales to speculators reached amazing levels in a few
hot markets.").

42. See James Jacobson, The Fight Against Speculation,

ALLBUSINESS.COM,

Dec. 21, 2008,

http://www.allbusiness.com/economy-economic-indicators/economic-indicators-newl 1728820-I .html
(explaining that developers used no-sales clauses to prevent sales competition from speculators within their

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 36:1

addition to adding to the supply of unsold units, spec buyers can undercut the
developer's prices. 43 And before the speculator sells, he or she will either rent the unit
or leave it vacant. None of these moves support developers' efforts to create viable
residential communities. Spec buyers are not going to be good neighbors; they do not
lavish the same tender loving care for their properties as owner occupants, participate
actively in home or condo association activities, or join local service organizations,
churches, bowling leagues, or PTAs. Several builders recently told the Wall Street
Journalthat they had underestimated the percentage of their sales to investors. Builders
figured that maybe 10% of their buyers were speculators, when speculators were
probably actually picking up a quarter of their inventory. Speculators routinely signed
documents promising they would reside in their homes when they had no such
44

intention.

Spec buyers also send false signals to builders and developers regarding housing
demand. 45 Tract homebuilders and condo developers try to avoid building units too far
ahead of demand by first taking non-binding reservations and then entering S46
purchase
and sale agreements with potential buyers before commencing construction.
One
Miami condo developer explained how non-owner occupants defaulting on their
purchase contracts misled him into building a 1,646 unit condo building that had been
90% presold with non refundable deposits of 20%. 47 Speculators fueled the market and
then fled, abandoning their contracts as soon as prices began to level off.48 Of the first
500 units built, the Miami condo developer only sold thirty, and many earlier buyers
filed suit for a refund of their deposits. 49 Currently, FNMA won't purchase a mortgage
from a bank unless 70% of the units have been presold to residents rather than
investors.5 0 This should make mortgage lenders more cautious about financing projects
for developers who don't institute appropriate procedures for detecting spec buyers.

own development).
43. Id. (explaining that a developer's selling price during the first phase of a development is usually 1520% less than the selling price during the last few phases, which allows speculators to buy during the first
phase of a development and then resell the property for less than the developer's selling price during the last
phase).
44. Steven Malanga, Predatory Lending, or Mortgage Fraud?, REALCLEARMARKETs, Apr. 9, 2008,
http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2008/04/predatory-lending-or-Mortgage.html.
45. See DOWNS, supra note 1, at 21 ("Accelerating increases in home prices and commercial property
prices in most parts of the nation from 2002 to 2005 stimulated further expansion of homebuilding, home
purchases by former renters, home purchases by speculators interested only in flipping the units they bought,
and greater investing in commercial real properties by institutional and other investors around the world.").
46. See Douglas J. Short, Comment, Use Versus Abuse: A Comprehensive Analysis of Nonbinding
Reservation Agreements and Real Estate Developers' Ability to Freely Rescind, 30 CAMPBELL L. REv. 201,
203-07 (2007).
47. Terry Pristin, Miami's Monument to Excess: Condo Colossus Becomes Symbol of a Building Boom
Gone Bust, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at B7.
48. Id.
49. Id. Spec buyers are suing Florida condo developers for deposit refunds, claiming that the developers
knew, or could easily have learned, that these buyers wouldn't qualify for financing and encouraged them to
buy anyway, promising they could "flip" their units profitably. The plaintiff's lawyer, Robert H. Cooper,
explains: "They were, across the board, signing contracts with purchasers they knew did not have the ability
to consummate the transaction." Patrick Danner, Condo-buyer Lawsuits Mount, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 3,
2007, at 1C.
50. Pristin, supra note 47. See also Fannie Mae, Announcement 08-34: Process Eligibility Review
Service and Changes to Condominium and Cooperative Project Policies (Dec. 16, 2008),
https://www.efanniemae.comlsf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2008/0834.pdf.

2010)

Should We Ban or Welcome "Spec" Home Buyers?
How Home Builders and Condo Developers Tried to Screen Out Home Flippers.

Homebuilders are well aware of the risks posed by buyers who are non-owner
occupants. According to a 2005 survey of its members by the National Association of
Homebuilders, four-fifths of all homebuilders try to confine sales to owner occupants.51
Home builders report a variety of means to screen out speculators:
1. 64% reported prohibiting buyers from assigning their purchase and sale agreements
or designating a nominee to take title at closing;
2. More than half insert provisions in purchase and sale agreements prohibiting sales
within the first year of ownership;
3.36% of builders reserved rights of first refusal to buy back homes sold within the
first year at the builder's selling price;
4. 36% refused to allow any units to be rented within the first year after purchase;
5. 18% would not sell more than one home to buyers with the same last names;
6. 18% used a variety of other measures, including steep fees for homes resold within
52
the first year.
7. Some builders have reserved the right to disclose suspected mortgage fraud to the
buyer's lender.

Condo developers and home builders seldom place the types of restrictions
mentioned above into recorded deeds. 53 Instead, these restrictions tend to appear only in
purchase and sale contracts, unrecorded. There are two reasons for this. First, deed
restrictions are best reserved for relatively permanent restraints, not transitory ones.
Developers and builders have no reason to preclude non-owner occupants from buying
individual units in the resale market after they have sold out all their units. During the
initial sales push for a new development, spec buyers can impact prices enormously,
because so many units are on the market at once. After the initial sell out, it is unlikely
that individual unit buyers will place their units on the market all at once, thereby
reducing the chances that spec buyers could skew prices throughout the project.
Second, developers and builders want to avoid impairing the marketability and
value of their units. By placing either a contract or deed in the public land records that
limits transfers by non-owner occupants, developers put subsequent purchasers and

51. David F. Seiders, The Seiders'Report,NATIONAL OUTLOOK, July 2005, at 11 (on file with author).
52. Id.
53. Because developers seldom impose owner occupancy requirements in new housing tracts or condos,
local governments require developers of affordable housing to impose such restrictions. In this way they hope
to benefit future buyers of limited means, and prevent the first generation of buyers from pocketing the
subsidy by selling their units to the highest bidders. See, e.g., Alfaro v. Community Housing Imp. System &
Planning Ass'n, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 2009), as modified on
denial of reh'g, 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 377 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. Mar. 18, 2009) and review denied, 2009 Cal.
LEXIS 4875 (Cal. May 13, 2009).
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mortgagees on constructive notice, potentially clouding the titles of all grantees, owner
occupants and non-owner occupants alike. 54 Before buying or financing a unit subject
to a recorded restriction like this, observant purchasers and cautious lenders would
demand title policies assuring them that they are not buying in contravention of the
restriction. 55 In order to write such policies, prudent title insurers would seek written,
recordable evidence of compliance, probably verified by the grantor or the grantor's
successors. 56 This could impede sales not just to spec buyers but also to owner
occupants who might have no problem confirming their intentions regarding residency
in a purchase and sale agreement but who might balk at accepting a deed restriction that
could complicate their attempts to sell sometime in the future and possibly also deter a
mortgage lender from financing their present purchase or eventual sale.
Imagine, though, a developer or builder determined to stamp out spec buying by
any lawful means, regardless of the potentially adverse impact on sales. The most
effective way of doing this would be through a recorded deed restriction calling for title
to revert to the grantor if a non owner occupant tried to sell within, say, six months or a
year of acquiring title. The venerable doctrine barring restraints against alienation might
bar enforcement of such a restriction.
Alternately, condo regimes often prohibit owners from renting their units. Such
restrictions upon rentals are contemplated in state condominium laws, 57 may appear in
the Declaration of Condominium, 58 in deeds from the developer to individual units, 59 or
by laws enacted by the homeowners' association according to procedures outlined in the
documents that established the condominium regime.
Doctrinally, restraints on

54. See WILLIAM H. PiVAR & ROBERT J. BRUSS, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW 225-27 (3d ed. Update
1997) ("The recording statutes provide that, after being acknowledged, any instrument or judgment affecting
title to, possession of or rights in real property may be recorded ....
Recording a document gives the whole
world constructive notice of the fact recorded.").
55. Cf Terri Cullen, Lenders Should Pay for Title Insurance, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 11, 2005,
http://www.realestatejoumal.com/buysell/taxesandinsurance/2005021 1-cullen.html (explaining that lenders
require home buyers to purchase title insurance before closing).
56. See Kenneth M. Morgan & Tracy A. Siebold, Discouragementof Affordable Housing Development
and Financing, 195 N.J.L.J. 856, 857 (2009) (describing the necessity for title companies of discovering
affordable housing restrictions in title searches and requiring documentation from borrowers to ensure that the
borrower complies with the restrictions). Title insurers will want to assure compliance with recorded deed
restrictions because the insured lender or buyer would take title subject to those restrictions and would seek
indemnity from the title insurer. See id.
57. See Joe Adams, Condo Act Requires Insurance, FORT MYERS NEWS-PRESS, May 25, 2006, at
G1, available at http://www.becker-poliakoff.com/pubs/articles/adams/adams_2006_05_25.pdf ("Section
718.110(13) of the Florida Condominium Act was amended effective October 1, 2004 to provide that any
amendment restricting unit owners' rights relating to the rental of units applies only to unit owners who
consent to the amendment, and unit owners who purchased their units after the effective date of that
amendment.").
58. Cf Mullin v. Silvercreek Condo., Owner's Ass'n, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 484, 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)
(interpreting restrictions in the Declaration of Condominium, which provided that "[n]othing in this [section]
is intended to restrict the right of any condominium unit owner to rent or lease his... condominium unit from
time to time").
59. See, e.g., Villas West 11Homeowners Ass'n v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274, 1277-1280 (Ind. 2008)
(involving homeowners' association's enforcement of a no-lease covenant in the deed of a home purchased in
a planned unit development).
60. See, e.g., Kroop v. Caravelle Condo., Inc., 323 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (affirming
lower court's determination that an amendment to the Declaration of Condominium prohibiting leasing of any
unit more than once during the period of ownership was reasonable and could be applied to an owner who
purchased the unit before the amendment was adopted, because the owner had purchased the unit subject to
all terms of the Declaration, including the term that the Declaration could be amended in the future).
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alienation fall into one of three broad categories: disabling, forfeiture, and
promissory.61 A disabling restraint invalidates the grantee's attempt to transfer property
contrary to the terms of the restraint. 62 The transferee takes nothing; title remains intact
with the grantee, unburdened by the purported transfer. 63 Under a forfeiture restraint,
the grantee's title terminates following a prohibited transfer, and title reverts to the
grantor. 64 A forfeiture provision may take the form of a reservation by the conveyor of
a power of reentry, exercisable when the grantee tries to sell in disregard of the
restriction. 65 The third type, promissory restraints, consists of covenants, conditions or
restrictions on the ownership or use of the transferred property, enforceable by a suit for
injunction or damages against the breaching owner. 66 A grantee that violates a
promissory restraint becomes liable to the grantor for damages or injunctive relief.
The burden of disabling and forfeiture restraints falls upon those to whom the
grantee attempted to convey in violation of them. Generally, courts are extremely wary
of disabling or forfeiture restraints; some courts treat them as invalid per se, 67 while
other courts tend to grant enforcement subject to a judicial determination of
reasonableness, case-by-case. 68 The venerable doctrine baring restraints against
alienation would probably bar enforcement of a restriction calling for •title
69 to revert to
the grantor if the grantee failed to occupy the unit within a specified time.
Generally, no-lease restrictions avoid characterization as unlawful restraints on
70
alienation by virtually always being made enforceable only as promissory restraints.
The penalties for breach are usually monetary and fall on the condo unit owner who
violates the no-lease restriction. Courts generally uphold promissory restraints upon
rentals as reasonable restraints on alienation unless the monetary penalties are
horrifically disproportionate to the harms done. 7 1 Rarely are provisions prohibiting
61. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuitiesand Restraints on Alienation § 90 (2008).
62. Merrill I. Schnebly, Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests: 1,44 YALE L. J. 961, 963-64
(1935).
63. Id.at 963.
64. See id.
65. Id.at 963.
66. 61 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61, at § 90 (promissory restraints). See Dieckmeyer v. Redevelopment
Agency of Huntington Beach, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 895, 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the equity share of
the condominium, which was part of an affordable housing program, was not due upon the purchaser's
prepayment of the loan since the covenants, conditions, and restrictions recorded on the deed had not been
violated).
67. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 30 (3d

ed. 2000)

("Provisions purporting, without any limitation as to duration or scope, to prohibit the transfer of a present fee
simple absolution-so-called 'disabling restraints'-or to defeat or terminate what would otherwise be a
present fee simple absolute upon transfer-so-called 'forfeiture restraints'-are universally held void in the
United States.").
68. See, e.g., William B. Stoebuck & John W. Weaver, Restraints on Alienation, in 17 WASH. PRAC.,
REAL ESTATE 2D § 1.26 (2009); Richard Seigler, Cooperativesand Condominiums, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 11, 2007,
at 1, 3, available at http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub243.pdf ("Generally, New York courts will uphold
restrictions on the alienation of property if such restrictions are deemed reasonable. The reasonable test
consists of three main factors: price, duration, and purpose." (citing Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Brunken Realty
Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379, 385 (N.Y. 1986)).
69. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. of Cal. v. Bregant, 661 N.W.2d 498, 502-03 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
70. See Kelley v. Broadmoor Coop. Apartments, 676 A.2d 453, 458-461 (D.C. 1996) (upholding a
condo association's levy of a surcharge on the monthly association dues of any owner renting her unit, up to a
maximum of 25%, where there was no evidence that the surcharge was unreasonable, subjective, or
discriminatory).
71. See, e.g., Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 144-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 36:1

rentals cast as disabling restraints invalidating the tenant's lease or as forfeiture
72
or
restraints, forcing the unit owner to surrender title to the condo association
73
unit.
the
occupying
ever
in
interest
no
admits
prohibiting sale to a grantee who
Sometimes, courts allow gift-givers to impose forfeiture and disabling restraints
against ungrateful donees and their inattentive lenders when the grantor had marked
down the purchase price to account for the diminished value of the restricted
conveyance.7 4 Similarly, courts uphold restrictions imposed by the promoters of
subsidized housing to preclude occupants from capturing the benefit of the subsidies by
selling or leasing at market prices and, thereby, frustrating the purpose of making
subsidized housing available to low- or moderate-income occupants for a long enough
time to amortize the social investment.
By contrast, the doctrine barring forfeiture restraints against alienation would
almost certainly preclude developers and builders who sold to spec buyers at market
prices from deeding property in fee simple determinable but reserving the right to

(setting forth the criteria for testing the reasonableness of restrictions). In Laguna Royale, the court held:
The criteria for testing the reasonableness of [a restriction on the right of alienation set] by an owners'
association are (1) whether the reason for [the restriction] is rationally related to the protection, preservation
or proper operation of the property and the purposes of the Association as set forth in its governing
instruments and (2) whether the power was exercised in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner. Another
consideration might be the nature and severity of the consequences of application of the restriction (e.g.,
transfer declared void, estate forfeited, action for damages).
Id. (citations omitted).
72. See Jordan 1. Shifrin, No-Leasing Restrictions on Condominium Owners: The Legal Landscape, 94
ILL. B.J. 80, 80-81 (2006) (reporting that condominium associations are adopting provisions eliminating
rentals; legal challenges to these restrictions are seldomly successful); William B. Stoebuck & John W.
Weaver, Occupancy Controls, in 18 WASH. PRAC., REAL ESTATE 2D § 12.9 (2009) (reporting on precedents
which suggest that "no [forfeiture] restraint should be imposed upon the owners of Washington condominium
units"); see also Flagler Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Crestview Towers Condo. Ass'n, 595 So. 2d 198, 200
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
In Flagler Federal Savings & Loan, the original recorded Declaration of Condominium prohibited
owners from leasing their units without approval of the owners' association, but the no-leasing restriction did
not apply to institutional mortgagees who acquired title to the units. The plaintiff became a mortgagee of two
units while the original Declaration was in effect. In 1984, the owners' association amended the Declaration
to prohibit leasing entirely. A few years later, the plaintiff acquired title to one of the units through foreclosure
and the other unit by quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure. When the plaintiff attempted to lease the units, the
owners' association objected, prompting the plaintiff to file a declaratory judgment action. The court held that
the plaintiff was bound by the no-leasing rule included in the amended Declaration, just like non-institutional
mortgagee owners who acquired title prior to the amendment.
73. See Bregant, 661 N.W.2d at 502-03 (denying the right of the homeowners' association to enjoin a
mortgage foreclosure sale to a buyer with no intention of occupying the unit purchased, because it would
unduly impair the marketability of the condominium).
74. See, e.g., Alby v. Banc One Financial, 128 P.3d 81, 84 (Wash. 2006) (upholding a restraint on
alienation where it was reasonable and justified by the legitimate interests of the parties).
In Alby, an aunt and uncle deeded a family farm that was worth $100,000 to their niece and her husband for
$15,000. They conveyed a fee simple determinable, reserving a right of reverter if the grantees sold to a nonfamily member or mortgaged the property while the aunt and uncle were still alive. Five years later, the
grantees mortgaged the property for over $100,000 and soon defaulted. The lender foreclosed. The aunt
brought suit to quiet title in herself-the uncle having passed away-and prevailed. The foreclosing lender
was left with only a personal cause of action against the niece and her husband for repayment of the debt.
75. See Oceanside v. McKenna, 264 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding restrictions
requiring owner occupancy and precluding owners from renting their units in a subsidized housing project
where the restrictions were "clearly and directly ... related to the stated purposes of maintaining a stabilized
community of low and moderate income residents and discouraging speculation by real estate investors"); see
also Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its Vitality, 23 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 539, 621 (1995) (arguing that a court would likely uphold resale restrictions on a proposed mixedincome housing program).
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recapture title to properties sold by non-owner occupants contrary to the agreed
"blackout' period on sales. Instead, developers are entitled to reserve rights of first
refusal. 76 They do not have to match the price that the spec buyer may contract to
receive from a third party buyer; but developers seeking to exercise rights of first
need to reimburse the
refusal to prevent spec buyers from realizing quick resale profits
77
forfeiture.
a
perpetrating
avoid
to
price
spec buyer's purchase
IV. SHOULD GOVERNMENTS IMPOSE ALIENABILITY CONSTRAINTS ON SPEC BUYERS?
In one of the most often cited law review articles ever written, Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamed pointed out that the government not only grants basic entitlements
but also decides how individuals may enforce those entitlements. 78 There are three
choices, which Calabresi and Melamed characterized as property, liability and
inalienability entitlements. 79 The owners of an entitlement protected as a property right
have the prerogative of selling or not and of naming a price of their own choosing. 80 A
liability rule empowers others to interfere with or destroy an entitlement (like the right
not to be run down by a careless driver) upon payment of compensation through a
government-determined procedure. 8 1 An entitlement becomes inalienable when the
state prohibits or limits its transferability between willing buyers and sellers. 82
University of Chicago Law Professor Lee Anne Fennell, in a recent law review
article, noted that law and economics scholars have confined most of their writing to
property and liability rules and, for the most part, have overlooked the potential positive
role that restricting alienability might play. 83 She had in mind situations where market
driven transactions are usually thought appropriate but where for special reasons a norm
of inalienability could usefully discourage potential resellers from acquiring an asset in
a more
the first place. 84 She explores "conditions under which alienability limits offer
' 85
exclusion."
or
use,
acquisition,
on
limits
than
intervention
promising point of
Could alienability rules be superior to limitations on use or sales in discouraging
spec buyers from purchasing units in the first place? As Professor Fennell points out,
property can be acquired in a quest for wealth accumulation or as an item for personal
use and enjoyment. 86 Most home and condo owners acquire property for their personal
use and only incidentally as investments. Spec buyers, by contrast, are only interested in
profitable resales. Restricting their alienability options should discourage their
acquisitions in the first place, relieving lenders and developers from having to spend so

76. See Jacobson, supra note 42 ("The addition of the 'first right of refusal' to new home sale contracts
essentially allowed for a purchaser to re-sell their home by first offering it back to the developer ...").
77. Cf id. (finding that the right of first refusal allowed the purchaser to sell the home back to the
developer, "in most cases, at the price that was originally paid for by the purchaser").
78. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View ofthe Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Fennell, supra note 53, at 1404-05.
84. Id. at 1406.
85. Id. at 1408.
86. Id. at 1442.
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much energy trying to screen them out.
To date, no government has initiated a measure to render property inalienable in the
hands of non-owner occupants pretending to become residents in the way that, for
instance, sales of stolen goods 87 or endangered species 88 are prohibited even by bona
fide purchasers. Instead, probably the most effective disincentives to spec buying are
the provisions in the federal tax code that greatly favor home ownership 89 and deny
spec buyers capital gains treatment if they sell too soon.90
To probe the implications of a government imposed alienability restriction on spec
buyers, consider as an example University of Nevada Law Professor Ngai Pindell's

proposal of locally enacting an "anti-speculation zoning ordinance."

91

Enacting such

legislation on a local basis makes sense because of the uneven distribution of
foreclosures and spec buying "within states and within cities in each state. ' 92 The
proposed ordinance would preclude "first purchasers of residential property in newly
constructed developments of a certain size" from selling the property for three years "in
medium and large-scale communities of approximately twenty or more units" and
"would apply to both attached and detached single-family housing."93

87. 63C AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 61, at § 34 ("Even though [an innocent purchaser of stolen goods] may
be treated as having title and the right to possession as against everyone but the rightful owner, a sale by the
thief or by any person claiming under the thief does not vest any title in the purchaser as against the owner,
although the sale was made in the ordinary course of trade and the purchaser acted in good faith ....
The
owner may, through an appropriate action or proceeding, recover the stolen goods, or their value, either from
the thief ... or from any other person who has not acquired such title and into whose possession they have
come, whether innocently or otherwise.") (citations omitted).
88. Steven D. Andrews, Does the Endangered Species Act Contain an Innocent Owner Defense to Civil
Forfeiture?, 1997 U. CHLI.LEGAL F. 375 (evaluating the success of innocent owner defenses under the Lacey
Act and the Endangered Species Act).
89. See GERALD J. ROBINSON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE 1-I to 1-2 (6th ed. 2007)
(summarizing the tax benefits of homeownership).
Part of our heritage is rooted in Coke's declaration, "A man's home is his castle."
Pride of home ownership runs deep in the American character. Indeed, from colonial
times to the present, virtue has somehow been associated with property ownership. The
tax favoritism that Congress has bestowed upon homeowners is a reflection of these
attitudes and of the immense political power of homeowners.
Homeowners are accorded numerous tax privileges not allowed to the landless
tenant. For example, the homeowner is permitted to deduct direct payments of real
estate taxes [26 U.S.C. § 503 (2006)] and mortgage interest [26 U.S.C. § 163(h)
(2006)]. Yet residential rent is a wholly nondeductible "personal" expense, even though
part of it is indirectly attributable to the landlord's taxes and mortgage interest.
Similarly, the virtue of home ownership is rewarded when the owner sells a home at a
gain. Tax on the gain may be escaped entirely if it does not exceed $250,000 or
$500,000 for married taxpayers filing a joint return [26 U.S.C. § 121 (2006)]. No other
personal asset is so favored. Indeed, the favoritism is so marked that it was in
substantial measure responsible for sparking a nationwide movement to cooperative
and condominium apartment ownership, which enjoy similar tax blessings.
Id.
90. 26 U.S.C. § 121(a) (2006) (excluding the "gain from the sale or exchange of property if, during the
[five] year period ending on the date of the sale or exchange, such property has been owned and used by the
taxpayer as the taxpayer's principal residence for periods aggregating [two] years or more" from gross
income).
91. Ngai Pindell, Fear and Loathing: Combating Speculation in Local Communities, 39 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 543 (2006).
92. DOWNS, supra note 1, at 69. See also id. at 22 exh.l-14, 68-69 & exh.3-4 to 3-5 (comparing rate of
foreclosure by city, state, and county within California, respectively).
93. Pindell, supra note 91, at 546.
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Professor Pindell's proposal is preliminary and suggestive. Though he does not
purport to spell out all the details, he recognizes the need for administrative exceptions
for those purchasers truly intending to hold the property for three years, but unable to
complete the period because of extenuating circumstances. The inclusions of such
exceptions to the ordinance would likely necessitate an administrative system to
evaluate the merit of waiver claims, monitor compliance, and conduct enforcement
94
through civil or perhaps criminal penalties.
However, Professor Pindell also thoughtfully acknowledges:
[E]xceptions to an anti-speculation measure threaten to swallow the
rule as local governments would face understandable pressure to
approve individual or categorical exceptions to the application of the
ordinance for hardship and similar unforeseen occurrences. The
number of people entitled to exceptions could outnumber those not
entitled to exceptions, and the administrative burden of identifying
bona fide cases for exception could be overwhelming and threaten to
95
outweigh the benefits of the legislation.
Professor Pindell's outline of an anti-spec buyer ordinance leaves open "the
' 96
appropriate resale limitation period [and] the appropriate punishment for violations."
To comply with due process standards, an ordinance would probably have to be
recorded in the chain of title of each affected property in order to invalidate the titles of
97
those who purchased from spec buyers within the three year blackout period.
Would real estate closing attorneys, brokers or title insurers be responsible for
warning the buyers they represented or insured of the existence and implications of the
ordinance? Maybe so. Professor Pindall suggests:
The local government could require that an affidavit of compliance be
included with the sales contract or other aspects of the purchase
process. A person making a false statement on the affidavit or failing
to comply with the instructions of the affidavit would be subject to
civil or criminal proceedings. Local government might monitor buyer
activity through property tax payments or deed recordings. 98
Since lenders and developers are in a far better position to recognize spec buyers
than most city administrators and have a greater incentive to do so, Professor Pindell
advances the possibility that developers and builders could be the primary initiators of
anti-spec sales provisions. 99 They could enlist local governments to assist with
enforcement through development agreements or other means, 100 in the way that private
10 1
deed restrictions are enforced by local governments in Texas.

94. Id. at 547.
95. Id. at 595.
96. Id. at 547.
97. See Story Bed & Breakfast, LLP v. Brown County Area Plan Comm'n, 789 N.E.2d 13, 21 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that "a covenant, standing alone without having been recorded, may not be asserted
against a subsequent [bona fide purchaser] who is without knowledge of the covenant's existence").
98. Pindell, supranote 91, at 588.
99. Id. at 588-89.
100. ld.at 589.
101. See e.g., TEX.Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 212.153 (2009) (allowing municipalities to sue to enjoin or
abate violations of restrictions affecting subdivisions within the municipality); 15 HOUSTON CODE §§ 10-551
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On balance, alienability limits would not be a sensible response to deter spec
buying. For starters, there is the cost to the government of enforcement and of possibly
recording notices of the ordinance in the chains of title of all affected properties.
The assumption that a municipally-imposed minimum holding period would deter
spec buyers is questionable. After all, this is a class of buyers willing to risk the
possibility of FBI investigations and federal prosecutions for mortgage fraud and of
having their mortgages foreclosed for violating pledges of owner occupancy. The
sanctions for violating a minimum holding period ordinance pale by comparison,
especially since it is highly improbable that enforcement would be well-funded and
effective. 102

While such an ordinance might not deter spec buyers, it might discourage buyers
from acquiring personal residences anywhere in the enacting jurisdiction. The buyers'
and mortgagees' title insurance costs would be greater, because proof would be required
that they were not buying or financing into a violation. Additionally, purchasers forced
to sell within the blackout period due to changing life circumstances---divorce, death,
job relocation, financial stress-would need to procure an administrative exception
from the local government. They could not safely conclude a sale until the exception
was granted. This process could result in a costly delay in a market where house prices
were steadily declining, especially if the local government was slow to respond.
Affected owners might find themselves locked into a less-than-optimal situation for
a period of years. At least with privately imposed constraints, developers and lenders
could grant waivers to spec buyers should a time come when market conditions make
spec buyers more welcome.
Consider the adverse consequences Professor Pindell's ordinance would have
wrought in his home town of Las Vegas if enacted in 2006. Precluding spec buyers
from selling for three years might have deterred some buyers from entering the then
overheated market in the first place, but it would probably also have added to the stock
of unsold, abandoned and foreclosed houses once the market plunged.
Inalienability rules are a bad idea if they are designed to hold back the shifting
sands of market values. Richard Posner reminds us that "speculation is a valid method
of aligning prices with underlying values." 10 3 In 2005 spec buyers were disdained for
driving prices out of reach for home seekers. Though spec buyers were not held in high
regard when their bidding was perceived as fueling a dangerously expanding housing
bubble, speculators are now warmly welcomed for bidding prices off of historic lows.
There is a good reason for this. A bursting housing bubble causes pain to many, starting
with home owners, builders, developers and lenders. Conversely, spec buyers who snap
up houses at severely depressed prices are seen as helping to avert a free fall deflation in

to 10-555 (2009), available at http:/www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=10123&sid=43 (expand
"Chapter 10" list; then expand "Article XV Deed Restriction Compliance" list) (authorizing city attorney to
bring a suit for injunction in order to enforce restrictions that affect subdivisions within Houston).
102. WILLLAM FULTON, GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA PLANNING 139-40 (2d ed. 1999). ("Even when code
violations are caught and cited, local governments have difficulty motivating property owners to comply with
the law. The property owners may pay a fine and promise to clean up their act, but in all likelihood they won't
change the way they do business-for two reasons. One is that code enforcement officers are usually
overworked, and property owners know it will take a long time before the officers get around to doing followup. The second reason is that the threat of further punishment usually doesn't exist.").
103. POSNER, supranote 37, at 89.
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04
house prices and the job layoffs and bank insolvencies that deflation can bring. 1
In the present post-bubble era, speculative buyers are playing a vital function in
stabilizing falling prices, especially where they are putting a floor on house prices by
actively bidding on foreclosed homes. 105 Some housing markets have become virtually
moribund where prices once soared and then collapsed to less than half their former
levels. 106 These markets are being resurrected with the help of absentee investors
107
purchasing nearly the same ratio of homes as when house prices were peaking.

Perhaps in tacit recognition of the important role of spec buyers in the current market,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now will purchase up to ten home mortgages owned by
108
the same borrower, where previously they would have purchased no more than four.
Often, the foreclosed borrowers become tenants in the very houses they once owned,
pay rents at levels well below their previous mortgage payments, and hope someday to
09
buy back their homes. 1
Though genuine homebuyers may not miss the challenge of trying to outbid
home flippers in the housing market, builders and developers welcome any entrants into
the ranks of home buyers who can help lift prices above production costs and make
homebuilding become profitable once more. 110 A seasoned California real estate broker
specializing in branded real estate, resort and luxury condo sales recently remarked,
"[O]ne thing is for certain, we sure miss those speculators." III Had an ordinance been
enacted in Las Vegas like the one Professor Pindell suggested, it would almost certainly
have been repealed by now at the insistence of real estate brokers, home builders,
mortgage lenders and home owners. An inalienability ordinance would no longer be
sustainable because spec buyers are now welcome as much needed rescuers of deflated
housing markets.
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